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THE NEW RIGHT AND THE CONSTITUTION: TURNING BACK THE LEGAL CLOCK. By Bernard Schwartz.!
Boston: Northeastern University Press. 1990. Pp. x, 310.
$32.50.
David P. Bryden 2

Professor Bernard Schwartz is best known as a prolific historian of the deliberations of the modern Supreme Court. In this
book, he turns from history to jurisprudence, sounding an alarm
against the ideas of conservative legal scholars and judges. His
chief targets are Robert Bork, Lino Graglia, Richard Epstein, Richard Posner and Antonin Scalia. Their ideas, he asserts, "have come
to dominate the legal landscape." Yet they "would turn back the
constitutional clock by a century," with the result that "Jim Crow,
child labor, the third degree, and destructive individualism may
once again characterize American society."
Professor Schwartz does not pretend to be an original jurisprudential thinker, and it would be easy to dismiss this book as patently
hyperbolic. Certainly it will be news to Judge Bork and Professors
Epstein and Graglia, if not to the other villains in Schwartz's
drama, that their ideas are now "dominant." It will also be news, to
anyone who hasn't been living on Mars, that Jim Crow and child
labor may soon reappear.
Nevertheless, I found the book most interesting, chiefly because Schwartz attacks two different types of conservatives: "original intention" restraintists like Bork, plus "law and economics"
activists like Epstein. This is not necessarily a self-contradictory
project, but it is one that requires a degree of dialectical flair. The
task, of course, is to show that Bork and company are wholly wrong
without showing that Epstein and company may be at least partly
right. If the Constitution is as flexible as liberal jurisprudents usually contend, then why not flex it in the direction of substantive
economic due process? Throughout the world, market solutions are
proving superior to socialism. Should constitutional law reflect that
modern reality? I read the book in order to gain enlightenment on
this topic.
Whatever else one may say about Professor Schwartz, there's
no denying that he is a mainstream constitutional scholar. As such,
he is in some ways more interesting than a highly original jurispruI. Edwin D. Webb Professor of Law, New York University.
2. Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. I want to thank my colleague John
Cound for reading this review and making several hepful suggestions.
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dent. The original thinker may be more impressive, but is unlikely
to reveal quite as much about the dilemmas and contradictions of
ordinary constitutional thought.
I

Concerning the intentions of the framers, Schwartz makes
most of the usual points: their intentions are often hard to discern;
Madison may have thought one thing, another delegate something
else, and a state ratifying convention something different still; the
framers wisely left much of the text vague; and in any event a "living Constitution" is superior to "machinelike exegesis of a fundamental text." Adherence to the framers' intentions, Schwartz adds,
would lead to some horrendous results: for example, paper money
would be unconstitutional, and barbaric punishments for crime
would be upheld. Substantive due process would disappear, which
would "remove the great safeguard that our courts have develped
against arbitrary governmental action." Bolling v. Sharpe would be
overruled, and so the federal government would be allowed to impose racial segregation. Indeed, "Since the Fourteenth Amendment's framers did not intend it to prohibit school segregation,
reliance on original intention as the determinative factor could have
meant a different decision in the Brown case." Likewise, an
originalist approach to the establishment clause could lead to results that, however appropriate in an eighteenth-century context,
would be "irrelevant to the needs of our society two centuries
later."
Even on their own terms, says Schwartz, the conservatives are
often wrong about the Constitution. They condemn Griswold, for
instance, as a revival of natural law, yet "natural law itself has been
an essential element of American constitutionalism." Furthermore,
"Both the history and the language of the Ninth Amendment indicate that there are individual rights requiring protection even
though they are not enumerated in the Constitution or Bill of
Rights." "Above all," the framers "would have emphasized the
right of property as one that depended more on the nature of man
than specific constitutional guaranty." By the same token, although
no constitutional provision specifically protects marital rights, "few
will disagree that there are such rights and that they are beyond the
reach of government."
Schwartz believes that it is a mistake to assume "that the conception of non textual rights must rest wholly on the unfettered discretion of the judge . . . ." When the Court creates or expands a
nontextual right, it is only doing what common law courts have
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done for centuries. In determing which rights are fundamental,
judges "are not left at large to decide cases in light of their personal
and private notions." Instead, they look to "the traditions and collective conscience of our people." "By training and tradition, the
Justices are well-equipped for this task; they can be expected both
to be keenly perceptive to violations of personal rights and to be
sufficiently detached to avoid imposing their purely personal notions, not shared by others, upon society." After all, "Our judges
are products of our society, and ... they will generally think along
with the beliefs of some substantial segment of the citizenry."
Therefore, Bork's concern about judicial creativity is misplaced.
It would be impossible, in the narrow compass of a book review, to respond fully to each of these arguments. In any event, I
have no fundamental quarrel with many elements of the standard
liberal brief against originalism. I do object to some argumentsfor instance, the strained effort to derive Griswold and Roe from the
ninth amendment,3 and the analogy between the role of ordinary
judges in making common law, or interpreting statutes, and the role
of the Supreme Court in fashioning rules that not even Congress
can repeal. But I have at least as many reservations about standard
conservative "originalist" analyses as I do about the liberals'
arguments.
Like most authors, conservative as well as liberal, Schwartz
equates judicial restraint with originalism. Since the case for judicial restraint is commonly couched in legalistic terms, this is an understandable response: A legalistic brief for restraint begets a
legalistic refutation. But as Robert Nagel4 and otherss have suggested, the case for judicial restraint need not be overly legalistic.
Even if we wholly ignore the constitutional text and the intentions
of the framers, we must still decide whether, for example, we want
every state to be free to devise its own prophylaxis against coerced
confessions, or whether we prefer to have a national rule fashioned
by the Supreme Court. Since no one professes to favor turning all
governmental decisions over to the Court, even the freest of free
interpreters needs a theory of judicial restraint, or at least criteria
for selecting the Court's agenda. Quite apart from whether the
3. For a good analysis, see Alexander, Book Review, 1 CoNST. CoMM. 396 (1990).
However much the framers may have wished to retain old unenumerated rights, I see no
reason to conclude that they wanted to delegate to the Court the quite different task of creating new ones.
4. R. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES: THE MENTALITY AND CoNSEQUENCES
OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1989).
5. E.g., Bryden, Politics, the Constitution. and the New Formalism, 3 CONST. CoMM.
415 (1986).
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Constitution requires it, there is much to be said for the federalist
values of pluralism, diversity, and local responsibility, even though
the price of advancing these values is often high, and sometimes too
high. If freedom means anything, it means freedom to err. So instead of beating the dead horse of originalism, let's ask how much
freedom and diversity we want. It's a tough question, which is all
the more reason to discuss it.
The liberal brief against originalism is, I believe, basically
sound, but I object to its injudicious, debaterish quality. (Here
again, the same criticism could be made of most conservative jurisprudents.) Perhaps the best example of this phenomenon, in
Schwartz's book, is his argument that the Justices, though not truly
bound by law, are adequately constrained by the fact that they
wouldn't be on the Court if they were idiosyncratic thinkers, and by
their obligation to justify new rights by reference to "the traditions
and collective conscience of our people." Therefore, reasons
Schwartz, the Court's innovations are not simply subjective political
preferences. Surely Professor Schwartz would scornfully reject
these arguments if they were offered by a conservative as justifications for, say, Lochner, or for a decision holding that all affirmative
action is unconstitutional. It's not much solace to a conservative
who is appalled by a Blackmon opinion, or a liberal who can't stand
Rehnquist, to know that their life-tenured tormentor isn't "idiosyncratic." Isn't it obvious that in any constitutional dispute worth
discussing, from pornography to the tenth amendment, both sides
can draw from deep reservoirs of tradition and popular feeling?
Even in Griswold, where the law was far more arbitrary and unpopular than most, Connecticut was on the side of some powerful
American traditions-if nothing else, democracy.
My most basic reservation about the brief against originalism is
that it's an unreal issue, like debating whether the United States
should adopt pacifism as our national policy. The notion that there
is a constant battle between originalist and nonoriginalist Justices,
though widely accepted by both sides in the Great Debate, rests on
a confusion between two radically different senses of the word.
There are indeed many "originalist" decisions in the sense of decisions that one supposes the framers would have approved as interpretations of the Constitution. In this weak sense, every Justice is
an originalist from time to time. For example, most of the framers
probably would have thought it absurd to say that the first amendment protects nude dancing. A Justice who declines to protect
nude dancing shares the original attitude, and should be applauded
(or condemned) on policy grounds for doing so. But this does not
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necessarily mean that he is an originalist in the strong sense of being
prepared to follow wherever the framers lead: he may merely disapprove of nude dancing. After all, Justice Brennan sometimes cited
the framers' intentions when it suited his purposes, yet he disavowed originalism. As a theory of legal obligation, "originalism"
must mean let-the-chips-fall-where-they-may originalism. In this
strong sense, how many originalist decisions have been handed
down? In other words, how often have the Justices interpreted an
ambiguous constitutional phrase in a way that appears to depart
from their own political preferences, because of a sense of obligation
to follow the framers' intentions (whether narrowly or broadly defined)? Obviously, we cannot say for certain, but after reading
Supreme Court decisions for many years I have found none that
seem to have been reached by consulting the ideas of the framers,
where those ideas plainly contradicted the Justices' own political
tendencies.
Brown v. Board of Education, for example, may or may not be
consistent with the framers' beliefs about equality, expressed at
some appropriate level of generality. But it surely was not an
originalist decision in the strong sense that I have described. If the
Justices had paid no attention to the fourteenth amendment, they
would, no doubt, have reached exactly the same result.
I see evidence that the clear language of the text of the Constitution has sometimes affected results, for instance in fixing the
length of the president's term of office, but I know of hardly any
evidence that, where the text is thought to be ambiguous, Justices'
votes are determined by the results of research into the framers'
intentions. Perhaps some individual votes can be found, but I doubt
that the Court as a whole has ever decided a controversial case in
this manner, reaching a result that the Justices would not have
reached if they had been a Council of Revision. Originalism is a
wonderful academic plaything, the most delightful toy in the sandbox of constitutional jurisprudence, but it's not the way the world
works, or can be made to work. The pretense to the contrary is the
main defect of conservative constitutional thought.
II

Like most liberal constitutional thinkers, Professor Schwartz
regards himself as an anti-formalist, opposing the "mechanistic"
theories of conservative strict constructionists. But once he turns
from Bork on original intention to Graglia on school busing,
Schwartz himself becomes what might be called a liberal legal formalist. Notwithstanding his strictures about the "living Constitu-
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tion," Schwartz manages to discuss school busing for racial
integration without assessing-or even acknowledging the importance of assessing-the effects of busing on education, race relations, poverty, and the decay of our cities. Professor Graglia has
depicted court-ordered busing as "disaster by decree"; this appraisal, though it may be mistaken, is not implausible.6 Given the
anti-legalistic stance of his chapter on Bork, one would expect
Schwartz to respond to Graglia by weighing the evidence on school
busing's effects, in order to arrive at a good public policy for the
courts to enforce. Instead, he treats cross-district busing for
integration as an irresistible deduction from Brown v. Board of
Education.
Busing, he says, has been a "remedial" measure. The meaning
of this characterization is unclear. At times, Schwartz seems to be
talking about the need to deal with segregationist stratagems in the
aftermath of Brown. But at times he seems to mean that the integrationist purpose of Brown will be defeated if neighborhood
schools are maintained, inasmuch as urban neighborhoods tend to
be divided along racial lines. Neither of these arguments is wholly
unfounded, but they are far from being a judicious reading of
Brown's ambiguities or a pragmatic appraisal of whether busing for
integration is good social policy, in a city like Seattle, in 1991. If
indeed we have a "living Constitution," it will not do to invoke
Brown v. Board, mechanically, as a solution to problems arising
nearly forty years afterwards.
Liberal legal formalism also provides a mechanical answer to
Epstein, Siegan, and Posner. Their theories, explains Professor
Schwartz, run counter to several decades of "settled law" and
would "resurrect Lochner." Q.E.D.
Concerning Lochner, Schwartz sounds like Thayer, Holmes, or
Frankfurter. "In holding the Lochner law invalid," he explains,
"the Court in effect substituted its judgment for that of the legislator, and decided for itself that the statute was not reasonably related
to any of the social ends for which the police power might validly be
exercised." Schwartz prefers the approach taken by Justice Harlan
in dissent: where the reasonableness of a regulation is debatable, it
should be upheld.
The next question, obviously, is why this sort of judical restraint, long since abandoned by most liberals in civil liberties cases,
still makes sense in economic regulation (and affirmative action)
cases. "The Siegan posture," Schwartz reminds us, "is, of course,
6.

See, e.g., Feldman, Book Review, 3

CONST. COMM.

644 (1986).
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contrary to the now settled jurisprudence on the subject." Schwartz
does concede, however, that this "settled jurisprudence" is a relatively recent development: the framers regarded property rights as
central, and until the late 1930s the Court did not wholly reject this
view.
At bottom, Schwartz's reason for rejecting property rights is
not legalistic. He argues instead that property rights reflect outmoded laissez-faire, Spencerian notions that grind down the poor. He
invokes Brandeis as a kind of substitute Founding Father: "Compare the Brandeis brief, with its emphasis throughout on the economic and social conditions that called forth the challenged statute,
with Lochner, where those factors were all but ignored. The difference is as marked as that between the poetry of T.S. Eliot and Alfred Austin." Well, I suggest that Professor Schwartz re-read some
of those Brandeis briefs. I assure him that if he reads the "expert
evidence" in the Muller brief to a law school class next year, and
tells the class that he agrees with Brandeis's experts' opinions about
women, the students will either laugh at him or lynch him. Brandeis was a fascinating thinker and an extremely talented lawyer, but
his briefs do not deserve the lavish and uncritical adulation that
progressives have bestowed on them. 1
To illustrate the difference between Brandeis and his ignorant
brethren, Schwartz mentions New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann. At
issue was a state law requiring a certificate of convenience and necessity for entry into the business of manufacturing and selling ice.
Licenses were to be issued only upon proof of the necessity for a
supply of ice at the place where the applicant wished to establish the
business; the application was to be denied if existing licensed facilities "are sufficient to meet the public needs therein." The Supreme
Court struck down this licensing requirement. Rejecting this decision, Schwartz cites Brandeis for the proposition that duplication of
ice plants is wasteful and leads "to destructive and frequently ruinous competition," which is "ultimately burdensome to consumers,"
evidently because it may lead to a monopoly. Having described
Brandeis's view, Schwartz then sets forth the contrary view of
Judge Posner, who believes that, "The people actually wronged by
the statute were the poor, who were compelled to pay more for ice;
the well-to-do, as Brandeis pointed out, were more likely to have
refrigerators."
How does Schwartz decide between Brandeis and Posner? By
asserting that the Chicago school of economists, on whose theories
Posner relies, "has never reconciled itself to the fact that, in this
7.

See generally, Bryden, Brandeis's Facts, 1 CONST. COMM. 281 (1984).
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century, the invisible hand of Adam Smith has increasingly been
replaced by the 'public interest' as defined in regulatory legislation
and administration." He accuses such economists of trying "to immunize the economy from interference by the machinery of the
law." They want to resurrect "the doctrine of laissez-faire that
dominated thinking at the turn of the century." In short, Professor
Schwartz evaluates the Brandeis-Posner dispute about New State
Ice without even trying to assess the effects of the law on the poor.
He relies instead on name-calling, invoking scarewords like "Legal
Darwinism," "laissez-faire" and "individualism" that he knows are
anathema to his politically correct readers. It's like denouncing the
income tax as "communistic" at a Rotary Club luncheon in 1900.
The same evasive quality permeates Schwartz's discussions of
other cases raising economic issues. He rarely or never discusses
empirical evidence about the effects of individual laws, relying instead on familiar formulas and catchwords, all the while criticizing
tum-of-the-century conservatives for doing exactly the same thing.

III
Most of us tend to spend our lives repeating the political and
jurisprudential shibboleths that we learned long ago in school, and
Professor Schwartz is, to say the least, no exception. This is perhaps most apparent in his discussion of takings and just compensation. Here again, Schwartz warns that the New Right are radicals
who "aim to uproot established doctrine and replace it with principles long repudiated by a settled line of case law." I'm shocked.
"To Epstein," he intones, the takings clause "is far broader than its
literal language." Imagine that!
One of Epstein's theses is that the courts should revive the requirement that takings be for a "public" rather than a "private"
use. I have not studied that problem, but it seems to raise three
basic issues. Are there some takings that should be criticized, even
if accompanied by compensation, on the ground that they are unwise or unjust? I suppose that the answer to that question is yes: if
the Minnesota Legislature confiscates my property and awards it to
the Governor's nephew, for no apparent reason except that he
wants it, probably even Professor Schwartz would be moved to criticize the politicians. The next question is whether the courts should
have some role in preventing this sort of thing. And the third question is whether they should have as large a role as Professor Epstein
desires. I had an open mind on these last two questions when I
began to read Schwartz's discussion, and I regret to say that it is
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equally open today. Here is a typical passage from Schwartz's
treatment of the subject:
It should not be forgotten that both the police power and the eminent-domain
power are only different weapons in the governmental arsenal, all of which are intended to enable government to serve the great public needs that the prevailing
thought of the day deems essential to the welfare of society. In an era dominated by
an ever-expanding police power, it would be anomalous if an equally vital governmental power were confined within the narrower range permitted to it when the
police power itself was more rigidly construed.

A nice debater's point, perhaps, but not very helpful if one is
trying to decide whether there are real abuses that need judicial correction. Perhaps the police power also needs to be supervised more
aggressively by the courts; if so, any "anomaly" will vanish. Certainly many state zoning cases, applauded by liberals, have endeavored to second-guess the police power, in order to combat
"exclusionary zoning." (Of which more in a moment.) In any
event, I see nothing anomalous in stricter scrutiny of a law that
expels me from my land (albeit with compensation) than of a law
that merely reduces the value of the land somewhat (albeit without
compensation). I know that some specialists think that urban redevelopment ("slum clearance") is beneficial, while others have tried
to prove the contrary. Yet Professor Schwartz has only this to say
about Berman v. Parker : "Slum clearance bears a reasonable relationship to the ends that may be attained by the state's police
power; hence the land involved is being taken for a public use."
Now that may indeed be the proper conclusion in cases like Berman,
but what I need are reasons, not musty formulas from the first edition of Corpus Juris. Specifically, I need to know whether the takings that Epstein condemns are good public policy and, if not,
whether there are nevertheless good reasons for the courts to uphold them.
Instead of analyzing the realities of eminent domain, Schwartz
discusses the original meaning of the just compensation clause, to
determine "whether it supports Epstein's interpretation"! He
quotes Bork to the effect that Epstein goes too far, apparently forgetting that, in his effort to refute Bork in an earlier chapter, he
gave property rights as the main example of a right that the framers
considered to be independent of any mere textual provision. After
reviewing the history of protections against takings without compensation enacted before the fifth amendment was adopted, he concludes that the original intent was limited to physical seizures; it did
not extend to regulatory "takings." Schwartz then proceeds to argue that the concept of regulatory takings is inconsistent with the
"ordinary meaning" of "taking" and, finally, that Epstein's argu-
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ment for enlargement of the concept is "completely contrary to the
established law on the matter."
The "established law," as Schwartz correctly notes, generally
upholds police-power regulations against takings challenges except
in some cases where the regulation has prevented the landowner
from making any beneficial use of the property. Even then, regulations prohibiting nuisance-like activities are usually upheld.
Although the law on regulatory takings has not changed much
over the decades, the courts in heavily-developed states like Pennsylvania and New Jersey have often invalidated large minimum lot
sizes and some other zoning techniques that increase the cost of
housing and thereby exclude less affluent purchasers from suburban
enclaves. Zoning is no longer regarded, by most land use specialists, as a "progressive" type of regulation, resisted only by blind
adherents of laissez-faire. Long ago, authors like Seymour Toll and
Richard Babcock brilliantly exposed the role that zoning plays in
segregation by class. So even if Epstein is mistaken about takings,
there is a growing scholarly consensus in favor of aggressive judicial
intervention to protect the interests of moderate-income families in
affordable housing. Most often, the landowner-developer is the
party best able to vindicate that interest, given the cost of litigation
and other constraints on "public-interest" plaintiffs.
What does Schwartz say about all this?
Epstein's animadversion notwithstanding, the Euclid decision remains a
landmark in the legal transformation of property that has taken place during this
century, under which the virtually absolute right of the owner to use his property as
he chooses has given way to the principle of reasonable use, as defined by the relevant authorities.

Schwartz fixes his eyes on the parties: the government (which
in his view always represents the public interest) and the developer,
who is of course a greedy landowner from Central Casting, asserting an "absolute right" to "use his property as he chooses." In
Schwartz's world, nonparties have no stake in this contest. In particular, he seems oblivious to zoning's role in keeping out the unwashed-the sort of people who live in mobile homes on quarteracre lots. "The principal concern in typical zoning and town-planning regulation," he blandly assures the reader, "is how an area
looks." "Aesthetics," he informs us, is the chief motive behind
"zoning restrictions laying down minimum lot size and minimum
floor space." Schwartz is apparently unaware of the massive literature published during the past several decades, largely written by
his fellow liberals, which documents the exclusionary purposes and
effects of excessively strict "density controls" in suburban zoning.
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He is equally dogmatic in defending rent control. As with zoning, he accepts the ostensible purpose of the regulation at face value
and ignores nonparties. Rent control, he believes, functions to
"eliminate exorbitantly priced housing." Justice Scalia, he notes,
objected to a rent control regulation, on the ground that if poor
tenants are to be subsidized then the general public should foot the
bill, through taxation. In another rent control case described by
Schwartz, plaintiffs argued that, by giving tenants the right to a perpetual lease at a below-market rental rate, the ordinance transferred
to them a possessory interest in the land on which their mobile
homes were located. Plaintiffs asserted that the rise in prices of mobile homes in parks subject to this Santa Barbara ordinance reflected the transfer of a valuable property right to occupy mobile
home parks at below-market rates. The ninth circuit upheld this
complaint against a motion to dismiss.
One might expect a devotee of the living Constitution to analyze such cases by discussing the impact of rent control on the supply and cost of housing. But instead Professor Schwartz chastises
the ninth circuit for treating an "economic regulation" as if it were
a physical invasion (p. 135), "a notion that is supported neither by
logic nor precendent." Logic? Precedent? What became of the living Constitution? Oblivious to his own strictures about mechanical
jurisprudence, he observes that "limitation of the landlord's profit
has never been held a taking, so long as a reasonable return on investment is allowed."
Discussing another Scalia opinion, Schwartz says it is so bad
that it is reminiscent of Adkins v. Children's Hospital, the case in
which the conservative Court of the 1920's invalidated a minimum
wage that was limited to women. Having made this analogy,
Schwartz clinches his argument: the New Right jurisprudence
"means a return to the public law of the first part of this century,
with all the abuses that accompanied it-abuses before which government was legally powerless under the prevailing jurisprudence of
the time."
Maybe so, but Adkins is not an apt illustration. Even on the
left, the type of law at issue in Adkins-protective labor legislation
for women-is no longer regarded as an unmixed blessing: feminists often bemoan such "paternalism." On this, as on so many
issues, Schwartz is resting on the formulas of the 1930s. More fundamentally, Schwartz seems unwilling to consider the possibility
that even a sex-neutral minimum wage is harmful. The BrandeisFrankfurter briefs in Adkins and other minimum wage cases sought
to make light of unemployment caused by the minimum wage. But

1991]

BOOK REVIEW

347

more recently even some liberal economists-Paul Samuelson, for
example-have argued against the minimum wage on the ground
that its effects are perverse: although ostensibly designed to help
the poorest workers, it reduces their employment. I'm not saying
that it's impossible for a rational scholar to defend the minimum
wage, only that the case against Adkins needs to be argued, not
presumed.
Although Schwartz implies otherwise, the conservative Court
of yesteryear upheld most of the economic regulations that came
before it, including some questionable ones. Conceding arguendo
that some of their property rights decisions were erroneous, that
hardly distinguishes property rights from any other rights.
I wish I knew whether on the whole substantive economic due
process did more harm than good, and if so whether this was for
reasons that are intrinsic to the doctrine, so that if the Court revives
it the public will once again suffer. One way to avoid the question is
by some sort of process-oriented theory: if not Bark's legalism, then
Thayer's or Nagel's more political brief for judicial restraint. Several decades ago, Robert G. McCloskey-that most judicious of
scholars-examined the usual jurisprudential objections to economic due process, and found them unconvincing. He concluded,
however, that-given the Court's responsibilities in other areasthe Justices simply did not have time for a major, new undertaking.
I do not find this conclusion wholly persuasive, but it does have the
virtue of disposing of the issue without trying to wander through
the unfamiliar swamps of economic analysis.
Although Lochner is a convenient pedagogical and polemical
shorthand for the era, there is no reason to assume that its practical
consequences were either drastic or typical. Even if we could somehow calculate that Lochner had terrible effects on the lives of
thousands of workers, other property rights decisions may have
helped thousands of common folk, for example by fostering price
competition. Although Schwartz and other constitutional scholars
often imply that what's good for General Motors is bad for the
country, no one with even the slightest economic sophistication
would endorse such a silly presumption. A decision in favor of a
developer who wants permission to erect relatively cheap housing is
a decision in favor of moderate-income consumers, not just a victory for "a rich landowner," or "dog-eat-dog individualism." A decision in favor of a company that wants permission to sell a product
in an area where the politicians wish to protect other producers
against competition is, again, a decision in favor of consumers, not

348

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 8:336

just a victory for "a corporation," or "the privileged few," or "blind
adherence to outmoded Spencerian dogmas."
Several years ago I asked a friend of mine, an economist but a
liberal, to write an essay for Constitutional Commentary evaluating
the Supreme Court decisions involving New Deal legislation between 1932 and 1937. I told him that we would furnish abstracts of
the cases, and he would appraise the economic consequences of the
decisions. He recoiled in horror, saying that the project was much
too vast for a single economist. He would need, he informed me, a
team of specialists. I replied with a smile that economists must be
dumb: "Every professor of constitutional law knows that the Nine
Old Men hurt the poor."
The same dumb economist later reviewed Epstein's Takings for
me. Although he disagreed with Epstein on some points, he concluded that "much of what he says will make sense to economists of
various political inclinations."s Law professors, by contrast,
"know" that property rights help the rich and hurt the poor, and
we know it so well that, unlike my economist friend, we don't even
feel the need to prove it. Why bother to prove it? Our readers
know it too.

• • •
I once was invited to attend the bat mitzvah of a friend's
daughter. As part of the celebration, the presiding rabbi led a discussion of the concept of the chosen people, soliciting interpretations from the audience. Some of those interpretations were not
quite as ecumenical as one might have wished, and eventually the
rabbi decided to tell a cautionary story. The MacPhersons, it
seems, lived in a neighborhood that contained Jewish as well as gentile families. One day little Johnny MacPherson came running
home, in tears, to his mother. "Mommy, is it true that Jesus was a
Jew?" he asked in anguish. Mrs. MacPherson thought for a moment, then replied: "Yes dear, but don't you worry: God is a
Presbyterian."
Constitutional jurisprudence, in the sense of grand theories
about the role of the Supreme Court, consists by and large of earnest efforts to prove that God is a Presbyterian. That's why constitutional jurisprudence is so unsatisfying-except, of course, to
Scots.

8.
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